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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
Robert Bryon Dixon was convicted of possession of a controlled substance and 
sentenced to a unified term of seven years, with two-and-one-half years fixed.  He 
appeals from his judgment of conviction, challenging the district court’s denial of his 
motion to suppress.  He contends the district court erred in denying his motion to 
suppress because the officer who stopped his vehicle lacked reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity at the time of the stop. 
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
At approximately 2:45 a.m. on June 14, 2015, Boise Police Officer Tad Miller 
observed a vehicle driving in the outside westbound lane of Fairview Avenue in Boise, 
Idaho.  (Tr., p.6, L.16 – p.7, L.17.)  Officer Miller testified he observed the vehicle cross 
the dotted yellow line dividing the outside lane from the inside lane with its left tires for 
approximately two to three seconds.  (Tr., p.6, Ls.12-24; p.15, Ls.5-18; p.20, Ls.3-10.)  
This occurred one time over the course of approximately thirty seconds.  (Tr., p.15, 
L.19 – p.16, L.1.)  The officer testified this was “alarming” because “[i]t could indicate . . 
. the driver is possibly intoxicated.”  (Tr., p.8, Ls.3-6.)  The officer initiated a traffic stop, 
and the driver of the stopped vehicle, later identified as Mr. Dixon, pulled over in a “fairly 
timely” manner.  (Tr., p.8, Ls.9-12; p.14, Ls.22-24.)  
After the stop, Officer Miller observed Mr. Dixon was “very nervous and was 
looking around the vehicle unable to [remain] still.”  (Tr., p.9, Ls.20-23.)  He also 
observed the passenger was not wearing a seatbelt.  (Presentence Investigation Report 
(“PSI”), p.55.)  Another officer arrived on scene, and that officer found what he believed 
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to be a methamphetamine pipe in Mr. Dixon’s pocket while conducting a frisk.  (Tr., p.9, 
Ls.18-23; PSI, p.3.)  The second officer’s drug dog alerted on Mr. Dixon’s vehicle and 
the officers ultimately found multiple controlled substances, a pipe and a digital scale in 
the vehicle, and a small plastic baggie with methamphetamine in Mr. Dixon’s wallet.  
(PSI, p.3.)     
Mr. Dixon was charged by Amended Information with three counts of felony 
possession of a controlled substance, one count of misdemeanor possession of a 
controlled substance, and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia.  (R., pp.32-
34.)  The State also filed an Information Part II alleging Mr. Dixon was a persistent 
violator within the meaning of Idaho Code § 19-2514.  (R., pp.73-75.) 
Mr. Dixon filed a motion to suppress, supported by a memorandum and affidavit, 
arguing the stop of his vehicle violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution because the officer lacked reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity at the time of the stop.  (R., pp.56-65, 99-101; Tr., p.3, Ls.16-22.)  The State 
filed an objection to Mr. Dixon’s motion.  (R., pp.91-96.)  The district court held a 
hearing, at which Officer Miller and Mr. Dixon testified regarding the circumstances of 
the stop.  Mr. Dixon testified there was “no way” his tires crossed into the inside lane on 
Fairview Avenue.  (Tr., p.28, Ls.17-20.)  The district court denied Mr. Dixon’s motion.  
The district court found Officer Miller was credible and concluded he observed a 
violation of Idaho Code § 49-637, which provided reasonable suspicion for the stop.  
(Tr., p.38, Ls.10-24.)   
Following the denial of his motion to suppress, Mr. Dixon entered into an 
agreement with the State pursuant to which he agreed to plead guilty to one count of 
 3 
felony possession of a controlled substance, reserving his right to appeal from the 
denial of his motion to suppress, and the State agreed to dismiss the other counts and 
the Information Part II.  (Tr., p.41, L.17 – p.42, L.21; R., pp.113-20, 121.)  The district 
court accepted Mr. Dixon’s guilty plea and sentenced him to a unified term of seven 
years, with two-and-one-half years fixed, to be served concurrently with any other 
sentences he is serving.  (Tr., p.55, Ls.19-24; p.68, L.25 – p.69, L.4; R., p.127.)  The 
judgment of conviction was filed on February 16, 2016, and Mr. Dixon filed a timely 
notice of appeal on March 21, 2016.  (R., pp.126-29, 133-35.) 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err in denying Mr. Dixon’s motion to suppress? 
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ARGUMENT 




The district court erred in denying Mr. Dixon’s motion to suppress because 
Officer Miller did not have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity at the time he 
stopped Mr. Dixon’s vehicle.  The district court concluded the officer had reasonable 
suspicion that Mr. Dixon violated Idaho Code § 49-637 by driving across the dotted 
yellow line separating the two westbound lines of Fairview Avenue for approximately 
two to three seconds.  The district court erred.  Mr. Dixon did not violate § 49-637 
because there is no indication his movement either could not, or was not, made with 
safety.   
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
This Court uses a bifurcated standard to review a district court’s order on a 
motion to suppress.  State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 408 (2012).  The Court will accept 
the trial court’s findings of fact “unless they are clearly erroneous.”  State v. Wulff, 157 
Idaho 416, 418 (2014).  However, the Court exercises free review of “the trial court’s 
application of constitutional principles to the facts found.”  Danney, 153 Idaho at 408. 
 
C. The Stop Of Mr. Dixon’s Vehicle Was Not Supported By Reasonable Suspicion  
 
A traffic stop constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution.  State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 658 (2007).  However, “[l]imited 
investigatory detentions are permissible when justified by an officer’s reasonable 
articulable suspicion that a person has committed, or is about to commit, a crime.”  
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State v. Morgan, 154 Idaho 109, 112 (2013) (citation omitted).  “Reasonable suspicion 
must be based on specific, articulable facts and the rational inferences that can be 
drawn from those facts . . . and requires more than a mere hunch or inchoate and 
unparticularized suspicion.”  Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted).  “The test for 
reasonable suspicion is based on the totality of the circumstances known to the officer 
at or before the time of the stop.”  Id. (citation omitted).   
Based on the totality of the circumstances known to Officer Miller at the time he 
stopped Mr. Dixon’s vehicle, he did not have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.  
The district court concluded Officer Miller had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity 
because he observed Mr. Dixon violate Idaho Code § 49-637 when his left front and 
rear tires crossed the dotted yellow line dividing the outside and inside westbound lanes 
for approximately two to three seconds.  (Tr., p.38, Ls.10-24.)  The district court erred. 
Section 49-637 states, in pertinent part, that “[w]henever any highway has been 
divided into two (2) or more clearly marked lanes for traffic . . . [a] vehicle shall be driven 
as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from that 
lane until the driver has first ascertained that the movement can be made with safety.”  
I.C. § 49-637(1).  Where, as here, a driver’s left tires cross from the outside to the inside 
lane for two to three seconds, and there is no indication such movement either could 
not, or was not made with safety, the driver does not violate Section 49-637. 
The standard this Court applies in interpreting a statute is well settled: 
Statutory analysis must begin with the literal words of the statute; those 
words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the 
statute must be construed as a whole.  If the statute is not ambiguous, this 
Court does not construe it, but simply follows the law as written.  This 
Court interprets statutes according to their plain, express meaning and 
resorts to judicial construction only if the statute is ambiguous, incomplete, 
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absurd, or arguably in conflict with other laws.  Where the language is 
unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of the legislative body must be 
given effect, and there is no occasion for a court to construe the language.   
 
State v. Neal, 159 Idaho 439, 444 (2015) (quotation marks and citations omitted).  In 
addition, “[s]tatutes and ordinances should be construed so that effect is given to their 
provisions, and no part is rendered superfluous or insignificant.”  Id. at 445 (quotation 
marks and citation omitted). 
Idaho Code § 49-637 requires that, on a highway with more than two marked 
lanes, a vehicle be driven “as nearly as practicable within a single lane” and “not be 
moved from that lane until the driver has first ascertained that the movement can be 
made with safety.”  A driver does not violate this statute every time he fails to remain in 
a single lane on a multi-lane highway.  Interpreting the statute in this manner would 
render the “as nearly as practicable” language to be mere surplusage.  The statute’s 
command that drivers remain in a single lane “as nearly as practicable” requires nothing 
more than that drivers stay in a single lane to the degree it “is reasonably capable of 
being accomplished [or] feasible.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 1210 (8th ed. 2004).  This 
statute encompasses a recognition that it is not always practicable to stay precisely in 
one’s lane of travel.  A driver who briefly (here, very briefly) moves from his lane of 
travel to another does not violate the statute in the absence of any evidence that his 
movement either could not, or was not, made with safety.   
 The State did not present any evidence in the district court that Mr. Dixon’s brief 
movement from one westbound lane to the other either could not, or was not, made with 
safety.  Officer Miller testified “[t]here were other vehicles on the road” but he could not 
recall if there was a vehicle between his vehicle and Mr. Dixon’s vehicle.  (Tr., p.13, 
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Ls.16-19.)  Officer Miller did not testify that Mr. Dixon’s brief movement posed a danger 
to Mr. Dixon, the officer, or anyone else on the highway.  It would be an unnecessarily 
harsh interpretation of Section 49-637 to conclude that a driver can be pulled over, 
cited, and possibly then subject to intrusive searches, for moving briefly from one lane 
to another in a way that is not unsafe.  “Constructions that would render a statute 
productive of unnecessarily harsh consequences are to be avoided and any ambiguity 
in a statute should be resolved in favor of a reasonable operation of the law.”  
Higginson v. Westergard, 100 Idaho 687, 691, 604 P.2d 51, 55 (1979).  
At the suppression hearing, Officer Miller testified he did not observe any 
possible traffic infraction apart from the possible violation of Section 49-637, discussed 
above.  He was asked, “During the rest of the 30 seconds or so that you were behind 
[Mr. Dixon], would it be fair to say that he was well within his lane?”  (Tr., p.15, Ls.21-
23.)  He answered, “Yeah; I did not observe any infractions or I would have stopped him 
at that time for anything I’d observed.”  (Tr., p.15, L.24 – p.16, L.1.)  Because Officer 
Miller did not observe a violation of Section 49-637, he did not have reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity to support the traffic stop.  See State v. Young, 144 Idaho 
646, 649 (Ct. App. 2006) (concluding the magistrate correctly applied the statute at 
issue to determine no traffic violation had occurred, and the stop of the defendant was 
therefore not supported by probable cause or reasonable suspicion of criminal activity).1  
                                            
1 In denying Mr. Dixon’s motion to suppress, the district court noted that “once the 
vehicle was stopped, the officer realized the passenger was not wearing a seatbelt, 
which is also another law violation . . . .”  (Tr., p.39, Ls.22-25.)  This fact was not known 
to Officer Miller prior to the stop, and thus cannot be considered in determining whether 
the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion.  See State v. Emory, 119 Idaho 661, 
664 (Ct. App. 1991) (“The suspicion for the stop must be based upon objective 
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The stop of Mr. Dixon’s vehicle violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution and the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress.   
 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Dixon respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction 
and reverse the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. 
 DATED this 14th day of November, 2016. 
 
      _____/S/____________________ 
      ANDREA W. REYNOLDS 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
                                                                                                                                            
information available to the officer when he decided to make the stop, and cannot be 
bolstered by evidence gathered following the stop.”). 
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